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Abstract
Deceit, a distributed file system being developed at CorneU, focuses on flexible
file semantics in relation to efficiency, scalability, and reliability. Deceit servers are
interchangeable and collectively provide the illusion of a single, large server machine
to any clients of the Deceit service. Non-volatile replicas of each file are stored on
a subset of the file servers. The user is able to set parameters on a file to achieve
different levels of availability, performance, and one-copy serializability. Deceit also
supports a file version control mechanism. In contrast with many recent DFS efforts,
Deceit can behave like a plain Sun Network File System server and can be used by any
NFS client without modifying any client software. The current Deceit prototype uses
the ISIS Distributed Programming Environment for all communication and process
group management, an approach that reduces system complexity and increases system
robustness.
"This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DoD) under ARPA order
6037, Contract N0014-87-C-8904, and under NASA-Ames Grant No. NAG 2-593. The views, opinions,
and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as ati officlal
Department of Defense position, policy, or decision.
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
This paper discusses the Deceit Distributed File System which is being developed at CorneU
University. The research emphasis of the Deceit system is a more flexible file semantics
to address the problems of scalability 1, efficiency, and reliability. Our premise is that it
is valuable for the user to be able to adjust system semantics on a per file basis. Needed
features may be employed without paying a penalty for unused features. The default
behavior is equivalent to NFS.
Users select atypical features by overriding the default selections established by Deceit.
Here are some of the choices that a user or system administrator might make:
• Availability--there are many techniques known for handling machine crashes and
communication loss. Different solutions offer varying levels and types of resilience
and cost. For example, data replication reduces the probability that the file wiU
become unavailable for reading, but file updates become more expensive.
• Update propagation--there is a delay between when a client issues an update and
when that update is apparent to other clients. Some applications may have con-
straints on this delay.
• Causality--constraints may exist between files to provide file consistency. By having
the file system enforce such constraints, the user may augment or reduce the concur-
rency of updates and the success of file caching. For example, a run-time debugger
may require that an executable file and its source file are consistent.
• Update stability--it may not be necessary for an update to be_ _written to non-volatile
storage or sent to all replicas immediately. Asynchronous update propagation can
produce dramatic improvements in performance. Note that an update can be visible
to all clients before it is has been delivered to all file replicas. The difference between
update propagation and stability is clarified below.
The user can dynamically set fi/e parameters to select the method that Deceit uses to
provide the above properties. This paper describes the components of the Deceit file
system which provide these file parameters and also gives a less detailed description of the
lln this discussionscalabilitywillreferto the total number of fileservers rather than the number o["
clients.
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entire architecture. Some additional features that we plan to add in the near fut'ure are
discussed also.
There are many existing distributed file systems including RNFS, Andrew, Sprite, Locus.
Amoeba, SWALLOW, DFS, and Cedar (see bibliography for an extensive list of references).
We are deeply indebted to these other distributed file systems for many of Deceit's design
features. A full presentation of other distributed file systems is beyond the scope of this
paper, and a partial presentation would inevitably be unfair, so we only compare Deceit
to NFS in this paper.
This organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a general description of the
architecture with the major assumptions underlying the Deceit design. Section 3 describes
the file replication management protocols. Section 4 describes the parameters that a user
can set on a file. Section 5 is a detailed description of the logical structure of Deceit.
Section 6 describes some example scenarios where Deceit might be used, and Section 7 is
the conclusion.
2 General Architecture
2.1 Contrast between NFS and Deceit
One way to understand the Deceit architecture is to contrast it to the NFS architecture[47,
48,46]. In a normal NFS implementation, each server machine maintains a set of files
disjoint from the sets maintained by all other servers. These sets are structured into
directory trees, and each server may provide more than one directory tree. The file name
space 2 is built by linking together the directory trees provided by the servers into a single
tree. This linking is done separately at each client. Refer to Figure 1 for an example
directory tree. Clients may communicate with any subset of the NFS servers, but servers
normally never communicate with each other; of course, servers may act as normal clients
to each other.
Deceit and NFS use the same client/server communication protocol (i.e. the same transport
and RPC interface), so a Deceit service appears to be a NFS file service to a client. As
a result, Deceit provides a normal NFS name tree. All NFS operations are supported
2The file name space for a file system is the mapping between full path names and logical or physical
files.
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Figure 1: Example NFS directory tree
with no change to any client software. The fde handle is an important component of the
NFS protocol. A file handle is associated with each file or directory, and clients usually
refer to files or directories by file handle. This type of handle for files is common in the
file system literature[26,34,36]. Since Deceit uses the NFS protocol, Deceit provides file
handles. These file handles are guaranteed to be unique and usable as long as a replica of
the file exists.
A main difference between Deceit and NFS is that files are not statically bound to any
particular server; with Deceit, flies may move freely between servers. If a client request
arrives for a file at a server which does not have that file, the request is automatically
forwarded to a server that has the file. The reply is propagated backwards along the same
path. All servers provide an identical file service to clients so that clients have to explicitly
connect to only one server in order to access the entire Deceit service. A comparison
between Deceit and normal NFS communications paths is provided in Figure 2. When
one machine fails, Deceit clients can connect to another machine and continue operation;
standard NFS client software does not provide this capability. Users may think of Deceit
as a single, highly reliable and responsive server.
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A second difference is that Deceit allows replicationof fies. Files may have non-volatile
replicason any subset of the servers. It isimportant for disk and communication e_ciency
that fies are not always replicated on every server,since such a high degree of replication
is unnecessary for most applications. To this end, the user can specify a desired replica-
tion level and can provide explicit control over the placement of filereplicas,ifdesired.
Directories are handled similarlyto files;they are stored on a subset of the availableservers.
A third di_erence is that Deceit supportsa fileversion control mechanism. A user may
explicitlyproduce, manipulate, and delete specificversions of a fie. Also, a user can inquire
about the relationships between versions and ask Deceit to delete obsolete versions. This
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version control mechanism is "blended" into NFS semantics so that its use is optional.
Deceit provides a superset of NFS functionality. To allow the user to access this function-
ality, Deceit has additional commands and file operations beyond normal NFS operations.
Clients access these features by using special RPCs and by reads and writes to invisible
control files. Special commands are provided to list all versions of a file, locate all replicas
of a file, modify file parameters, reconcile directory versions, and provide other fimctions.
These commands are discussed below.
2.2 Cells
In the above discussion, it was assumed that all clients could directly access any Deceit
server, but this property is not necessarily true. Deceit servers can be subdivided into cells
to prevent Deceit from being non-secure (and inefficient) in a very large implementation.
Each cell is an independent instantiation of Deceit with distinct files and processes. Each
cell maintains its own name space, and replication must be contained within a cell. A
cell provides security and administrative boundaries. In our present implementation, cells
correspond to ISIS site clusters. An example of Deceit cells is shown in Figure 3.
Access between ceils is provided through a logical directory. There is a logical direc-
tory called the global root directory. It cannot be listed, as it implicitly contains the
full machine names of every accessible Deceit server. Instead, it is used indirectly as a
subdirectory of a normal directory. For example, if a user is in the Cornell computer sci-
ence cell and wants to access files in the MIT computer science cell, he picks a machine
"foo.cs.mit.edu" at MIT where a Deceit server is running. By executing the command "cd
/priv/global/foo.cs.mit.edu", a user can access the MIT cell with normal file operations.
The global root directory is a subdlrectory of "/priv." The Cornell cell acts as a client to
the MIT cell. Mount and access restrictions are applied as with any client.
2.3 Design Assumptions
A list of assumptions about the environment where a system will be used is fundamental to
any design. We will provide a short summary of our assumptions here. The assumptions
are grouped into three categories: network architecture, failure, and typical operational
behavior.
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Figure 3: Example configuration of Deceit servers with cells
Network Assumptions
The target environment is a network of computers used in a client/server fashion. Some of
the computers may be diskless, and some may be large dedicated file servers. We believe
that NFS offers an adequate file system interface for our purposes, and NFS is widely
accepted, hence all file requests from the clients are via the standard NFS interface. Under
normal conditions, all machines can communicate directly with each other through an
underlying network. Communication is symmetric: if a can send a message to b, then b
can send a message to a. The servers are grouped into administrative subsets called cells,
such that each cell is managed by a single centralized administration. Cells are assumed to
be a small number of local area networks (e.g. 10-100 machines). Network communication
is secure: messages are sent to the correct destination with a correct sources address, and
messages can not be examined by machines which are not the intended receiver. Since all
communication between servers is through the ISIS distributed system[2,3], all of the ISIS
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communication assumptions are present in Deceit.
Failure Assumptions
We assume that machines may crash without notificationS; messages may be lost dur-
ing transmission; and the network may experience long term communication partition. _
All machines have roughly independent failure probabilities. Network partitions may be
frequent. Within a cell, servers trust each other, but between cells there is minimal trust.
3E_
Operational Assumptions
Predictable file access patterns are central to the design and performance of Deceit. Many
of Deceit's design decisions were based on results from studies which were done in an
academic environment [39,14,13,44].
Deceit's operational assumptions are as follows. Files tend to be written or read in their
entirety with a stream of operations. Nearly simultaneous writes by two clients to the
same file are very rare. Files experience long periods of total inactivity punctuated by
high activity where they may be rewritten several times in a few minutes. File activity
tends to cluster in a small number of directories. The vast majority of NFS operations are
get attribute (get basic file attributes), lookup (find a file by name in a directory), read, and
write. Most files are small, i.e. less than 20 kilobytes.
2.4 Related Topics
The ISIS distributed system is used for crash and partition detection, communication
primitives, and process group management[33,22]. Some features that ISiS provides are:
several group broadcast protocols, atomic group membership change, mechanisms for lo-
cating group members by group name, fight-welght processes with signals and semaphores,
architecture independent communication, and process state transfer. As a detailed discus-
sion of ISIS would be a digression, the reader is referred to [4] for more information.
3For a more detailed discussion of machine and communication failure models, please refer to [3].
4Some readers may be aware that early versions of ISIS blocked during network partitions. As part of
our work on Deceit, and other ISIS applications, this issue was reexamined. We expect a version of ISIS
capable of surviving network partion to be available shortly.
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Throughout this paper, the term "user" will be used to refer to the person or process
who is initiating file system operations. In practice, some file system operations will need
to be restricted beyond normal file security. For example, a system administrator ma.v
mandate that users can generate at most three replicas of a file. The separation of power._
between users and system administrators is a fruitful area of research. In this paper, these
distinctions will not be discussed.
3 Replication Management
Replication is one of the most important mechanisms in Deceit. If critical system compo-
nents are distributed over several machines, then it is more likely that one of them will be
unavailable at any time. Replicating components is an obvious solution. There are only a
few file systems that allow files to be replicated among a set of servers[10,9,19,30,8,37].
Note, however, that caching is an important form of replication. Since caching is used in
all file systems, then they all must support some form of replication. The Andrew File
System[21] is a good example. Andrew supports caching on a client disk and in client
memory. Deceit also supports client memory caching.
A desirable property of any replicated data system is one-copy seriaIizability s. A file f
exhibits one-copy serializability if the results of reads and writes to f are indistinguishable
from the outcome of performing the same operations in a setting where there is only one
replica of f. One-copy serializability is a useful property since it implies that the ex.istence
of multiple replicas is hidden at the user level.
3.1 Replica Generation
Associated with each Deceit file is a minimum replica level that can be defined and changed
through a special command. If file f has a minimum replica level of r, then Deceit will
insure that there are at least r non-volatile replicas of f as long as enough servers are
available. To do so, new replicas may need to be generated. Associated with f is a server,
t, called the token holder of f. The token holder is responsible for generating and deleting
file replicas. Tokens will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. There are four ways
that a replica can be generated:
SOne-copy serializability is defined assuming all interprocess communication is through files.
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The token holder t may lose contact with a replica, t counts the number of correct
replies to an update broadcast for f. If the number of replies drops below r, then
t will create new replicas. If there are no updates, replicas may become unavailable
and later available without causing a new replica to be generated.
If the minimum replica level is increased, t will create new replicas.
A user may request the token holder t to create or delete a replica on a specific server
with a special command. Users may inquire about the current location of all replicas
for a file with another special command.
A server may request that a replica be generated in order to improve read perfor-
mance.
-..:
Method 4 occurs as follows. If a client accesses file f through a server s which does not
have a replica of f, then the operation is forwarded to a server which has a replica of f. As
a background activity, a local non-volatile replica is generated on s to speed future reads
and help ensure availability. In this manner, file migration is achieved with the replication
mechanism. Each client slowly gathers its working set of files to the server to which it
has connected. In some cases, the user may prefer that a replica is not automatically
generated; this parameter may be set by the user.
Replicas are generated with a file transfer protocol from an existing replica. A replica
holder feeds a copy of the file to the site where the replica is being generated through a
TCP connection. Non-blocking I/O and careful buffer management allow the connection
to run at high efficiency. The token holder delays updates during replica generation to
prevent inconsistency.
Eventually, there may exist several unneeded replicas of a file. The token holder t will
delete these extra replicas when an update occurs instead of updating them. They are
deleted in least-recently-used order. The user may ask t to delete a replica with a special
command.
Some existing DFSs allow files to be divided into segments for caching or replication. This
option allows finer grain control over data movement and more efficient access to very large
files. Unfortunately, it does not work well with the NFS protocol, and it greatly increases
the complexity of the system. We have decided not to provide this option at the present
time.
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3.2 File Groups
For any file, f, there is an explicit process group of servers that need current information
about f, which we will call the fi/e group of f. A process group is a set of machines
or processes; there must be a mechanism for broadcasting messages to all members and
sending messages to individual members. Deceit represents each file group with an ISIS
process group.
The file group for f contains all servers that have a replica of the file or have cached
information about the file. This set is a superset of the replica holders, and it includes
those servers which cache only timestamps or mode bits. The fundamental operation
within a file group is update distribution. An update to f originates from a client and is
given to its server. That server then broadcasts the update to all members of f's file group;
no other servers receive this update for f. Refer to Figure 4 for a schematic description
of update distribution. The concept of a file group is fundamental to the scalability of the
entire system, since only the size of f's file group affects the speed of updates to f.
In Deceit, a server needs to join a file group before it is allowed to broadcast an update
to, or have a replica of, that file. Joining a file group is an expensive operation and may
require a global search to find a member of the group. This operation is one of the main
obstacles to scaling Deceit to an arbitrary size. Deceit limits global search to within a
Deceit cell to ameliorate this problem. As a result, file groups must stay within a single
cell.
We believe that much of the complexity of distributed file systems arise in problems analo-
gous to those found in group management. For example, a read/write quorum protocol can
be viewed as a protocol for atomically broadcasting data updates to a group of replicas.
The problem of locating a file replica by file handle is similar to the problem of locating
a group member by group name. It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of our
present discussion, to compare file systems in these terms.
3.3 Write-tokens
To coordinate access to replicated data, we use a urrite-token protocol. This protocol is
based on one presented in [33,42]. A write.token[27,28] is associated with each file group.
Only a server that holds the token is allowed to distribute updates to the corresponding
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Figure 4: Update Distribution
file group. An update requires only one communication round 6 if the token is held. A
write-token protocol works well when update streams tend to originate from one source for
long periods of time as in a file system; under those conditions most updates will require
only one broadcast.
The token holder synchronously collects only the first s correct replies, where ,_ is the write
safety level of the file. After these s replies have been collected, the original client RPC
that requested the update will return.
A server that lacks a token must acquire it before distributing an update for that file.
Token acquisition requires one round, but it is only done for the first in a series of updates.
eA communication round is the distribution of a message to a set of processes. The collection of sylJ-
chronous replies is included in the round.
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To acquire a token, a server broadcasts a token reciuest to that file group. The server that
holds the token broadcasts a token pass in response. It is necessary for correctness that
the updates arrive in identical order at all servers regardless of token movement.
There are several optimizations to this protocol. One optimization is to broadcast an
update in the same message with a token request, replica holders execute those updates
upon receiving the corresponding token pass. Another optimization is to pass an update
to the current token holder instead of requesting the token if it is likely that there will
be only one update; for example, a small file that is overwritten in a single update will
probably not be updated again soon. Deceit currently uses neither of these optimizations.
3.4 Global One-copy Serializability
The write-token scheme described in Section 3.3 is sufficient to achieve one-copy serializ-
ability in a file system containing only one file, but a real file system will require a stronger
mechanism. Global one-copy serializability is defined as the property that clients should
observe one-copy serializability on the whole file system rather than simply on individual
files. A related property is real-time consistency; if one user writes a file and calls a friend
on the phone, the friend should be able to observe the update within a bounded delay.
Global one-copy serializability is stronger than simple one-copy serializability as is shown
in Figure 5. In this example, files z and y are initially empty. Client c_ appends to z and
then appends to y. Concurrently, client c2 successfully reads from y and then observes
that z is empty. This result is impossible if there is only one replica of z and y. Yet z and
y separately exhibit one-copy serializability.
An obvious solution is to wait for the update to complete at every member of the file
group before allowing a unite call to return to a client. Unfortunately, this can lead to bad
performance, particularly in the case where a replicated file is being written with a stream
of small updates. A more efficient mechanism that allow updates to complete concurrently
is called for.
Deceit provides global one-copy serializability with a stability notification mechanism. Be-
fore a file can be modified, all members of the file group are notified that the file is unstable.
All available r replicas must be so notified before any updates can occur (the failure of the
rA replica at server b is available to a if a can communicate with b. ISIS provides a clean notion of
availability since failure detection is coordinated with communication.
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Figure 5: Illustration of One-copy Serializability Example
token holder during stability notification is discussed in Section 3.5). After stability no-
tification, all file reads and inquiries are forwarded to the token holder. Only the token
holder's replica needs to be updated before a write can return to a client. One:copy
serializability is guaranteed because, in effect, the token holder's replica is now the "pri-
mary" replica. After a short peri0d of no write activity, the token holder notifies all other
members of the group that the file is stable again. Table 1 gives a short summary of the
sequence of events required in a normal update. Stability notification is normally invisible
to applications, and its main effect is on performance and update visibility to clients.
The main benefit of stability notification is that updates become visible to =all clients
simultaneousiy. 8 On the other hand, _ Overhead is incurred at the beginning and end
Sin a distributed system, simultaneous events may not appear to happen at the same physical time since
communication delay introduces uncertainty.
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Precondition
token is not held
replicas are not marked as unstable
Action
acquire token
mark replicas as unstable
true distributed update
failure detected count update replies
insufficient replicas
period of no write activity
generate new replicas
mark replicas as stable
Table 1: Typical Sequence of Events in an Update
of a stream of updates. This overhead can be expensive if updates are short and rare.
Also, reads that are concurrent with updates are more expensive. By default, Deceit uses
stability notification, but the client can specify that stability notification is not used.
3.5 Crash and Partition Failures
The algorithm presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.4 must be resilient to failure. The mechanisms
that Deceit uses for this purpose are presented below.
Histories and Version Pairs
Associated implicitly with each replica of file f is an update history f.h. An update history
is a list of all updates to the file and which server issued these updates. History f.h is an
ancestor of history f.h _ if f.h is a prefix of f.h'. The histories that all replicas of a file pass
through form a tree under the ancestor relation; this tree is called the histo_3 tree. Two
histories are incomparable if neither is an ancestor of the other.
Deceit does not explicitly store the full history of a replica. Instead, Deceit maintains a
one-to-one mapping from histories to integer pairs (vt, v2) where vl is the major version
number, and v2 is the subversion number s. v2 is incremented on every update, and vt is
changed to a new unique number every time there is a potential branch in the history
tree. These branch points are recorded with a replica so that version number pairs can be
°In the literature, this value is often called an update counter.
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compared as if the histories that they represent were available. For example, the relation
(vl = v_ A v2 < v_) :, (f.h is an ancestor of f.h') always holds.
A version pair is stored with each write token. The token version pair can be compared
to a replica version pair to quickly decide if a replica has received every update through
that token. This version pair is available to the user through a special command so that
the user can determine if a file has been modified.
Token Generation
If a client wishes to update a file, and no write token is available for the specified version,
a new token will be generated. Assume that the file being updated has major version
number v,, and a replica is available with version pair (vl,v2). Server s can generate a
new token by picking a globally unique major version number v[ and building a token with
version pair (v[, v2), then s stores v, with the new token. Replicas corresponding to the
new token are generated by copying the original replica.
Generating a new token is more than simply generating a new version pair. Every file
replica is associated with only one token. The new token represents a distinct new file
with a distinct set of replicas. After the new token is generated, enough replicas are
generated to satisfy the minimum replica level constraint. File data is drawn from the
existing available replica.
It may be necessary to constrain when a token can be generated. Deceit provides file
parameters settings that provide this capability. There are three options. The first option
is to totally inhibit the generation of new write-tokens. This option has the advantage that
a server can always write to a file after it has acquired the write-token, but it is easy to
suffer long term loss of file availability. The second option is to allow a server to generate
or use a token only if the majority of the replicas are available. A token becomes disabled
if the majority of the replicas becomes unavailable. This option provides relatively high
availability, and multiple versions can be generated only during transitional periods. On
the other hand, it is more difficult to implement, and write availability may be lost in the
middle of a stream of updates. The third option is to not restrict token generation at all.
Deceit uses this second option as the default.
Restricting updates to the majority partition requires a mechanism for counting the number
of available replicas. Replicas are normally counted by counting the correct replies to an
update broadcast. ALl replica generation must be accomplished through the token holder,
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so that the token holder always has an upper bound on the total number of rephcas. For
purposes of computing a majority, the total number of replicas is taken to be the ma:_imum
of the minimum replica level and the upper bound on the number of replicas. For a server
without access to the token, the total number of replicas is assumed to be the minimum
replica level; the number of available replicas is determined by broadcasting an inquiry to
the file group.
-v
Version Control System
During a partition event, multiple file versions can be generated. It follows that Deceit
must be capable of maintaining distinct versions which are distinguished only by different
values for the major version number, vl. The facility by which this is accomplished may also
be accessed directly at the user level as a normal file versioning system, such as in a source
code management system. Deceit uses a simple mechanism: file names can be qualified
with version numbers using a special syntax. For example, major version 3 of "foo" can be
referred to as "foo;3." By using this form of file name, specific versions can be created 1°,
modified, and deleted. By using an unqualified filename, the user automatically requests
the most recent available version. A directory entry actually uses the unqualified filename,
so creating a new file version does require an update to a directory. The system behaves
similarly to the VAX/VMSll[ll] version control system, except that VMS produces a new
version on every file update, while Deceit produces new versions only during partitions or
when explicitly requested.
Local Non-volatile Storage
Several types of information must be kept in non-volatile storage to allow recovery from
a crash. Each server stores all file data for its replicas. This data includes: the actual
data of the file, the replica state, and the version pair. Additionally, each server stores
all state information relating to each token that is held. Also, each server stores a non-
volatile copy of the map between file haudles and local file names. Some of a server's
non-volatile storage is updated immediately when values change, and some of it is written
asynchronously, depending on safety.
mDeceit selects major version numbers carefully to insure global uniqueness. Users must be careful when
creating new versions during a partition to preserve uniqueness.
IIVAX/VMS is a Trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation
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3.6 Crash Scenarios
In order to clarifythe usage of the crash resiliencemechanisms, several example scenarios
are presented.
Non-token Replica Crash
When a server s recovers from a crash, it contacts the token holder for each file f such
that s has a replica but no token for f. Each token carries the version pair that replicas
should have if they are up to date. If s finds that it has an obsolete replica of f, s destroys
it. Since the history for the replica of s is a prefix of the history associated with the token,
no update will be lost.
Token Crash
Token loss is detected when a server attempts to contact a token holder during the course
of normal read or update operations. Let us assume that server s needs to distribute
an update for a file, but it can not contact the current token holder. Subject to token
generation constraints, s can generate a new token. Since s now holds the token for a
version of the file, s can complete the original operation.
Assume that s could not contact the old token holder s' because s I had crashed. When
s' recovers, it will be notified about the creation of the new version during its recovery
protocol, s' will note that the new version is a direct descendent of the old version and
destroy the old version and all of its replicas.
Partition
Now consider the scenario where there was a network partition, but no updates were issued
to the file in the partition with the token. Read access on the token holder side continues
normally, since it is dif_cult distinguish between this scenario and the case where the other
replicas simply crashed. Write access in the partition which does not contain the old token
may cause a new token to be generated. When the partition is resolved, the old token
holder will be notified. It will appear to the clients as if the token had actually been
moved, and the updates were propagated very slowly to some servers.
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The hard case is when a partition occurs and updates are issued to the file on both sides
concurrently. In this case both of the incomparable versions of the file are kept, ancl a
notification is logged into a well known file. It is the responsibility of the user to resolve
such conflicts. By allowing the user to resolve incomparable versions, the semantics of the
file may be used for resolution [5,52,20]. Both versions are made available to the user and
may be edited, modified, or deleted independently. Since concurrent updates are assumed
to be rare, this case should occur very rarely.
Stability Notification in the Presence of Failure
If the token holder t for a file f loses contact with some of f's replicas during an update
distribution, those replicas might be left in an inconsistent state. Stability notification is
used to detect this case. Before an update is distributed, all available replicas are marked
as unstable. Therefore, if replica states are inconsistent, then all inconsistent replicas wiU
be marked as unstable.
Inconsistency is detected when a read is given to a server s which has an unstable repfica
of f, and s is unable to contact t. In order to respond to a read, s must locate a stable
replica, s produces a stable replica by broadcasting to f's file group to determine the state
of all available replicas. If there is a stable replica at server s _, the operation is forwarded
to s'. If no replica is marked as stable, s forces the most up to date replica to be stable,
and all obsolete replicas are destroyed.
Disastrous Failure
Despite all of these precautions, with a suitably pathological sequence of crashes and
recoveries, it is still possible to produce non-one-copy serializability. For example, if an
obsolete file replica recovers and all other replicas simultaneously crash, the file will appear
to go back in time. We could solve this problem by inhibiting token generation and by
consulting the token holder during every operation, but this solution would destroy most
of the benefit of replication.
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4 File Semantics
Deceit associates the following semantic parameters with each file:
Minimum Replica Level - the minimum number of valid replicas that must be main-
tained. For example, a minimum replica level of 3 would force Deceit to maintain a
valid replica on at least 3 separate servers. By default, the value is 1.
, Write Safety Level - the number of replica servers that must reply to an update
before a write RPC returns to a client. A value of 0 produces asynchronous unsafe
writes; a value greater than or equal to the number of available replicas produces
slow and fully synchronous writes. By default, the value is 1.
. Stability notification - specifies whether stability notification is to be used. Stability
notification guarantees global one-copy serializability and real-time update propaga-
tion, but there is a performance cost. The default is to use stability notification.
. File migration - should Deceit automatically attempt to create a non-volatile replica
of file f on a server that receives requests from a client for f. For some applications,
it may be bad to automatically generate local replicas. For example, for a very large
data file, generating a local replica may consume too much disk space. The default
is that file migration not be used.
. Write Availability Level - determine when Deceit can generate a new write-token if
a token has been lost. If this flag is set to "high", then a token may be generated
whenever one is needed. A high availability means it is likely that multiple file
versions will result due to a partition. A value of "medium" allows a new token to be
generated by server s only when s can contact a majority of the replicas, and a token
is disabled if fewer than the majority is available. As a result, some replicas may
occasionally be "read only," but multiple file versions will occur less frequently. A
value of "low" prevents the production of additional tokens. Loss of file write access
may be frequent and long term, but there is no chance of generation of multiple
versions. The default value is "medium."
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5 System Components
The Deceit server consists of two components as shown in Figure 6. The first component
is a distributed reliable segment server. The segment server provides a simple, flat, reliable
distributed file service with no user level security or user specified names. There is no
notion of directories or links in the segment server. The segment server implements all of
the update, replication, and versioning protocols, and it is the layer where file parameters
exist. On top of the segment server is a full NFS file service which uses the segment server
for storage and communication, called the NFS file service envelope.
File Service
Envelope
SegmentServer
Clients ...
NFS
client/server /
protocol //
File Service
Envelope
Segment [Server
UI_IX '
file
operati_
Machine
Boundary
File ServiceEnvelope
l'qormal -
procedure
call
SegmentServer
DJceit
interserver
protocol
Figure 6: Expanded view of Deceit architecture
Deceit does not directly address most security issues. It is assumed that communication
between instances of the segment server is secure (e.g. encrypted or physically secure).
Also, the local files used for storage by the segment server are inaccessible to unauthorized
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users. Client/server communication is secured, and client authentication is provided using
DES encryption in the NFS interface. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide
a detailed description of these mechanisms.
5.1 Segment Server
A segment contains an array of bytes that can be indexed by an offset. Associated with
a segment is the data in the segment, the values for each of the semantic parameters, a
version number pair, a process group, and read and write timestamps. The interface to
the segment server consists of five normal procedure calls: create, delete, read, write, and
setparam. Create has no arguments and simply returns a handle for a new segment of zero
length. Delete takes a segment handle and deletes all storage allocated for it. Read reads
a portion of a segment. Write modifies a segment by replacing, appending, or truncating
data in the segment. Setparam is used to specify semantic parameters on a segment.
It is valuable to have a form of serial transaction 12 when accessing a segment. Many
distributed files systems, particularly earlier ones, had strong mechanisms for executing
an atomic transaction. For example, DFS[45] had an extensive transaction mechanism
which involved locking and intention lists. SWALLOW[50,49] used a system of virtual
time stamps to provide serializability. The Alpine File System[6] used log files to provide
-_ recoverability. Later distributed files systems had weaker atomicity guarantees in order to
_" provide better performance.
To help provide a transactional capability, Deceit employs the version number pair. A read
call not only returns data, but it also returns the version pair associated with that data.
A write also returns the version pair of the segment after the write has completed. A write
call can also have a version pair as a parameter; in this case the urr/te will succeed only
if the version pair of the segment matches the version pair in the call when the data is
actually updated, otherwise an error will be returned. Using this feature, a limited type
of serial transaction can be achieved.
This notion of version pairs can be used to implement an optimistic concurrency control
mechanism. A read implicitly begins a transaction with the establishment of a specific
version pair for the segment. Writes are then issued with that version pair. A transaction
t_An atomic transaction two properties: recoverability and serializability. Recoverability means that the
transaction completes or fails entirely. Serializability means that the transactions exhibit behavior consistent
with some total ordering. A serial transaction is a transaction that only provides serializability.
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is implicitly completed when the last write completes successfully. A write which returns
an error due to the use of the wrong version pair is similar to a transaction which has
been aborted due to the detection of non-serial behavior. Unfortunately, there is no way
to back out of previous updates. The application which attempted the write can restart
with the original read or abandon the attempt entirely. In effect, transactions have been
transformed into light weight tasks which run at the level above the segment server.
A good example of this behavior is the addition of an entry to a directory in the Deceit
file system. The directory is read, and a position is selected in the directory for adding the
entry; this may overwrite an existing dead entry or append a new entry. Then, an update
is given to the segment server with the version pair returned by the original read. If a
version pair conflict occurs, the whole operation is restarted.
,;Ta-
5.2 NFS File Service Envelope
The full file service is built on top of the reliable segment server. The principle is that
every file, directory, or soft link is mapped into a unique segment. All NFS operations
are mapped into creates, deletes, reads, and writes on segments. The UNIX kernel does a
similar transformation when it transforms user file operations into disk operations. The fuU
file service inherits the distributed nature of the segment server to provide a full distributed
file system. Although the NFS envelope implementation is a large piece of software, it is
totally independent of the underlying implementation of the segment service. In principle,
it will never need to be changed despite radical changes in the segment server protocols.
Links and Garbage Collection
Since the segment server does not have a notion of links, it is the responsibility of the
NFS envelope to decide when a file is no longer accessible, so the storage for it can be
deallocated. Since both directories and files may have multiple versions, and since creation
of new links may be hidden behind partitions, it can be very difficult to decide when to
delete the segment for a file [29]. A normal NFS system has the advantage of centralized
control and single file versions, so a simple link count suffices (however the link counts can
be corrupted by an ill timed crash.)
We see two solutions to the prOblem: The first solution is to extend the concept of a link
count. The link count would correspond to the total number of link copies, where every
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replica of every version of a directory referring to the file is counted once. Refer to Figure 7
for an example of this type of link count. The link count is stored in the segment as normal
data. To maintain safety, it would be impossible to add a link to a file unless the file was
write available. Unfortunately, it would also be unsafe to create new replicas or versions
of directories unless each file in the directory was also write available. Another severe
disadvantage is that when the link count becomes corrupted, it is extremely expensive (or
impossible) to recalculate.
Directory 1 ]
Version 1 ]1
epl. 1 epl. 2 epl. 3
Version 3
Directory 2
Version 1
Repl. 1 Repl. 2 _epl.
X X IX
Version 2
Repl. 1 Repl. 2
X
Repl. 3
X- hard link to file
The total link count is 9.
Figure 7: Example of Link Count Computation
The solution we chose is more complex. An uplink list of directory file handles is stored
with each file. The NFS envelope attempts to maintain the property that if file f is in
directory d, then d is in the uplink List of some version of f. When a hard link is made to
f in directory d, d is added to the uplink list of all versions of f which can be updated at
that time. Deceit also keeps a standard hard link count with f, but it is only considered
to be a hint. When the link count goes to zero, the NFS envelope checks every available
version of every directory in the uplink list. If none have a link to the file, the segment is
deallocated; otherwise, the link count is corrected.
Our solution has several drawbacks. A file f may neither be moved nor additional links
made unless the uplink list of some version of f can be safely modified. Also, a server s
may add an uplink to f, but another server s' may never see that uplink if s' can only
contact a disjoint set of versions. As a result, s' may prematurely attempt to deallocate f.
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Another drawback is that if the link count of f is corrupted so that it is too large, f may
never be garbage collected. Finally, when a file is moved, two directories, a link count, and
an uplink list must be modified in some safe order. Garbage collection is discussed again
briefly in Section 7.
5.3 Client Agents
The agent is a simple but important component of Deceit. The agent is the client software
which interfaces between the user process and the NFS protocol. Currently, the agent runs
in the kernel, but the agent can be in several possible locations. Refer to Figure 8. These
different configurations provide widely differing performance.
User
program
Agent
normal procedure call,
interprocess communication,
kernel call,
or remote procedure call
user loadable library,
kernel procedure,
or auxiliary user process
localinterprocess communication,
or remote procedure call(NFS)
Server
Figure 8: Example Agent/Server Configurations
The agent satisfies two primary functions. First, the agent provides caching. The agent
5 SYSTEM COMPONENTS 26
caches file and directory data as well as information specific to the client/server protocol
such as NFS file handles and server information. Another agent function in Deceit is
failover. When one server fails, the agent must select another to continue operation. This
second capability requires an extension to the NFS protocol.
A third optional agent function is using an access shortcut. Normally, a server forwards
a requests for which the server does not have a replica. It is more efficient for the agent
to cache file locations and directly communicate with the correct servers. This capability
requires an extension to the NFS protocol.
Deceit currently uses the standard NFS client software provided in the Sun operating
system. This software does not provide failover or shortcuts. A new agent is being written
which will run as an auxiliary user process, and it will provide full functionality. An agent
which can be loaded as a user library and directly issues NFS RPCs is planned, and this
agent should greatly improve file performance.
A user library that acts as an agent is not easily implemented for several reasons. First,
since the NFS protocol requires file handles and there is no way to easily extract file handles
from the SunOS kernel, each user process will have to go through the full mount protocol
to get file handles. Also, since files will be cached in the user process virtual memory space,
processes will have to use some type of coordination protocol to share cached files.
5.4 ISIS
We made the decision to use ISIS after some consideration; an early version of Deceit did
not use ISIS at all. When we used ISIS, several issues arose:
ISIS requires a separate configuration and installation phase in addition to the one
required for Deceit. This requirement was an inconvenience during development, and
it will continue to be a problem in the future. A stand-alone package requiring little
or no additional configuration information would be preferable.
Deceit exposed several performance and development problems in ISIS. Group mem-
bership change, high volume state transfer, as well as other operations were too
expensive. Some ISIS features, such as partition tolerance, were underdeveloped
when Deceit began development. These issues are being addressed. Future versions
of ISIS should allow Deceit to have satisfactory performance.
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One particular problem was the huge number of process groups that could be gen-
erated by Deceit. In the current implementation of ISIS, process groups are ai1
expensive resource. More specifically, ISIS does not efficiently support more than
100-1000 process groups. Future versions of ISIS should support larger numbers of
process groups. Future versions of Deceit will be more careful with generating and
deleting process groups.
ISIS saved a large amount of development time. We started to use ISIS after real-
izing that we were reimplementing much of the ISIS functionality in Deceit. ISIS
also provides useful debugging primitives. We estimate that at least 6 months of
development was saved.
6 Scenarios
The previous sections provided a great deal of detail about Deceit without much discussion
about applications. To show how Deceit could be used to solve real problems, two impor-
tant application scenarios are listed below. For each scenario, there is a short description
of the scenario, followed by a description of how Deceit could be used efficiently in this
application.
6.1 Academic Public Workstation Environment
This environment is characterized by a large number of small, inexpensive, and unreliable
machines. Administrative control is often poor. Users spend the bulk of their time editing
or compiling. Files tend to be small, and their physical location is relatively unimportant,
but high availability is valuable.
This scenario is the easiest to solve since Deceit is being developed and tuned in this
environment. All of the semantic parameter defaults should be adequate. Users will
typically want to set the replication level to 2 or 3 on important source and text files; other
files can be regenerated if necessary. The system administrator should set the replication
level to be 2 or 3 on all important system directories, binaries, and libraries. Adding new
servers is simply a matter of configuring ISIS to run on the server, and executing the Deceit
server daemon. Files can be moved transparently from one server to another by the system
administrator at any time to provide better disk balancing.
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6.2 Data Collection and Dispersion
A large class of applications requires bulk data movement and manipulation. For example,
NASA collects huge amounts of data at several remote stations which is processed in a
central computing facility. A product development team uses large detailed specifications
to drive simulations which can be at a distant location. This environment is characterized
by a small number of large machines with large numbers of peripheral machines attached
to them. Extremely large files are common. Users collect large quantities of data on some
machines and analyze it at other machines. Since _e sizes often are at the limits of disk
space, controlling the location of the data is necessary. There may be large geographical
distances within the system.
For a very large data file, the user can turn of[ automatic localization to prevent uncon-
trolled generation of file replicas. Also the minimum replica level should be 1 until the file
has reached its final destination, and then it may be set to 2 to provide a single backup.
Since data versioning may lead to version conflicts, the write availability level will probably
need to be "medium" or even "low." Data files can be quickly copied from one server to
another using the blast file transfer mechanism in Deceit by manually forcing the creation
of a replica on the target server andthen deleting the replica on the source server. At any
time during the manipulation of the data location, the file data is available for reading and
writing via any server.
7 Conclusions
We believe Deceit provides enough flexibility so that most applications can have acceptable
performance and availability. All the basic features necessary for a full distributed file
system with replication have been provided. Deceit performance is not understood if the
environment does not satisfy the operational assumptions in Section 2.3. In such cases, we
may be required to add new operational modes be added to Deceit.
A version of Deceit exists and is used at Come]l, although it is not yet in general use.
Except for inter-cell communication, all of the features described above are implemented.
Development is still at an early stage, and we expect fundamental architectural changes
as our experience continues. Performance measures would be premature at this stage of
our effort.
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Two serious problems still need to be addressed. The first is file contention bottlenecks.
Certain files and directories such as the root directory will be accessed very frequently by
all servers. It is fortunate that these files tend to have read only access. It may be valuable
to have special file modes which are optimized for this combination of properties[38,24].
Another problem is the use of links and directories as discussed in Section 5.2. The current
solution is unsatisfactory, so we are looking for other solutions. Hopefully, a solution to this
problem may also offer a solution to the root directory contention problem. One possibility
that we are investigating is the use of file uplinks to allow non-volatile directories to be
discarded.
There are some performance problems with the process group management protocol.
Group joins are expensive, and broadcasts are more expensive than need to be. Also,
using a huge number of ISIS groups has a unacceptable effect of ISIS performance. Since
Deceit uses process groups in a restricted and well defined way, it is inefficient to use gen-
era/ ISIS groups for each file group. Several methods to improve performance are being
investigated.
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